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cusable.38 And the question of excusability is one of law and therefore
reviewable in every case.3 9 The leading case for this principle-is Norton
v. McLaurti 4° wherein the court outlined the rules governing applica-
tion of the statute. Upon entry of the motion to set aside, the judge
finds the facts on which it is based, and these findings are conclusive
on appeal when supported by the evidence. From such findings, he
determines whether excusable negligence has been shown. And from
this determination, either party may appeal. If he correctly determines
the negligence is not excusable, that puts an end to the motion. If he
correctly determines the negligence is excusable, then he may in the
exercise of his discretion grant or deny relief, and it is his ruling in this
particular that is reviewable only on a showing of abuse of discretion.
Hence, as might be expected, most of the cases in the reports have
turned on whether the legal ruling below was correct 4' rather than
whether the court had abused its discretion.4 2  The question of an abuse
of discretion thus becomes pertinent only43 where, as in the instant case,
the supreme court decides that the trial court in vacating the judgment
correctly held the negligence to be excusable.
DAVID M. McLLLAND.
Labor-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Union Liability
for Damages Under the Taft-Hartley Act
On June 23, 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act' made labor unions liable
in damages for the breach of collective bargaining agreements2 and for
injuries resulting from certain "unlawful" strikes and boycotts. 3 In
both types of cases the injured party is provided with unobstructed
M iManning v. Roanoke & T. R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S. E. 963 (1898) ; Stith
v. Jones, 119 N. C. 428, 25 S. E. 1022 (1896); State Bank, Ltd. v. Post Falls
Land & Water Co., 29 Idaho 587, 161 Pac. 242 (1916). Movant must also show
that he has a meritorious defense. Craver v. Spaugh, 226 N. C. 450, 38 S. E. 2d
525 (1946).
"Marsh v. Griffin, 123 N. C. 660, 31 S. E. 840 (1898); Griel v. Vernon, 65
N. C. 76 (1871) ; FREEMAN, op. cit. supra, note 31, §290 ("This discretion relates
only to the question whether under the particular facts and circumstances dis-
closed the case is one which merits relief ... It has no relation to questions of
law which may arise upon the facts, but such questions must, of course, be deter-
mined and be subject to review the same as any other matter of law.").
40 125 N. C. 185, 34 S. E. 269 (1899).
"1 Whitaker v. Raines, 226 N. C. 526, 39 S. E. 2d 266 (1946) ; Johnson v. Sid-
bury, 225 N. C. 208, 34 S. E. 2d 67 (1945); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Turner, 202 N. C. 162, 162 S. E. 221 (1931); Sutherland'v. McLean, 199 N. C.
345, 154 S. E. 662 (1930) ; Warren v. Harvey, 92 N. C. 137 (1885)."' Brown v. Hale, 93 N. C. 188 (1885); Kerchner v. Baker, 82 N. C. 169
(1880) ;'Bank of Statesville v. Foote et a1.,77 N. C. 131 (1877).
"No case has been found wherein the trial judge denied the motion to set
aside notwithstanding a legally correct ruling that movant's negligence was
excusable.
1 "Labor Management Act, 1947," 61 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. A. §141 (Supp.
1947).2 Id. §185. 'Id. §187.
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access to the federal courts to enforce his rights, and the union treasury
is subject to execution on the judgment. The person who has been
injured by an "unlawful" strike or boycott has the additional privilege
of seeking his remedy in any other court with jurisdiction over the
parties.
The amenability of unions in state courts has been chaotic. About
one third of the states have statutes making unincorporated associations
suable in their common names, but some of these statutes have been
judicially restricted to include only "business" associations. In states
without statutes on the subject the case law is even more confused.
Some accord unions the common law immunity 4 of unincorporated
associations, others utilize the devices of class suits or "waivable defect"
or estoppel, while a few allow unions to be sued on grounds of policy
and necessity. 5
Whether a collective bargaining agreement be considered a treaty,
or a mutually acceptable list of shop rules, or a common law contract
has also been in a state of confusion.0 Congress considered the diver-
gence among the states as to the status of collective bargaining agreements
and as to the suability of unions to be an interference with collective
bargaining and thereby a burden on interstate commerce. Therefore,
Congress took the next logical step in encouraging collective bargaining.
by recognizing such agreements as binding contracts and opening the
federal courts to insure a remedy.
The minority report of the Senate Committee 7 attacked the consti-
tutionality of the provision conferring upon the federal courts -jurisdic-
tion over suits for breach of contract "without regard to the citizenship
of the parties." Such a suit would have to come within one of two
possible grounds of judicial power as defined and required by the Con-
stitution.9 There must be. either diversity of citizenship, or the suit
must be one "arising under [the] Constftution, [or] the laws of the
United States," that is, it must involve a federal question. Since diver-
sity of citizenship is not a prerequisite under the Taft-Hartley Act, the
sole remaining source of judicial power is that of suits involving a fed-
eral question. The minority contended that suits on collective bargain-
" Hallman v. The Wood, Wire and Metal Lather's International Union, 219
N. C. 798, 15 S. E. 2d 361 (1941) ; Note, Suability of Unincorporated Associations
in North Carolina, 25 N. C. L. REv. 319 (1947).
'United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344
(1922); Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union, 147 F. 2d 865 (App. D. C.
1945) ; see generally: Witmer, Trade Union Liability, 51 YALE L. J. 40 (1941);
Note, 33 CAL. L. REV. 444 (1945).
8 1 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 492 (1940); GREG-
ORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 378 (1946); HARRIS AND Wn.LIAmsoN, TRENDS IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 58 (1945).
" SEN. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947).
861 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. A. §185(a) (Supp. 1947).
'U. S. CoNsT. Art. III §2.
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ing agreements would not meet the requirements of the federal question
type of judicial power in that such suits would involve primarily ques-
tions of state law and questions of fact.
The issue will arise when a suit in which the judgment is enforceable
against the union treasury and not against the individual members is
brought by or against a labor union in its common name for damages
on a collective bargaining agreement that Congress has declared binding.
Under such a state of facts, will the suit qualify as one "arising under
[the] Constitution, [or] the laws of the United States" and thereby
invoke the judicial power of the federal courts?
An affirmative answer to the proposition is called for by Osborne
v. The United States Bank in which Chief Justice Marshall said:
"We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power
of the Union is extended by the Constitution forms an ingredient
of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the
circuit courts jurisdiction of that cAuse, although other questions
of fact or of law may be involved in it.
"When a bank sues, the first question which presents itself, and
which lies at the foundation of the cause is, has this entity a right
to sue?... This depends on a law of the United States.... (This
is an important question, and it exists in every possible case.)" 10
The Act appears to give extraordinary privileges to a party bring-
ing an action. The suit may be brought without regard to either diver-
109 Wheat. 738, 823 (U. S. 1824). Accord, Davis v. Slocumb, 263 U. S. 158
(1923) ; Tex. & Pac. R. R. v. Kirk, 115 U. S. 1 (1885) ; Lucking v. First National
Bank-Detroit, 142 F. 2d 528 (C. C. A. 6th 1944) (distinguished the Gully case) ;
Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckart, 108 F. 2d 51 (C. C. A. 3d 1939) (suit
under the Securities Act which specifically gives district courts "jurisdiction to
enforce liability created by this title!'); Fishman v. Marcourse, 32 F. Supp. 460
(E. D. Pa. 1940) (action under the Fair Labor Standards Act in which the court
disposed of the jurisdictional question by tersely stating that district courts have
jurisdiction of cases under laws regulating commerce) ; McGoon v. Northern Pac.
R. R., 204 Fed. 998 (E. D. N. D. 1913). But cf., Gully v. First National Bank,
299 U. S. 109 (1936) ; Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S. 476 (1933) ; Gold
Washing & Water Co v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199 (1877); Costanzo Coal Mining Co.
v. Weirton Steel Co., 150 F. 2d 929 (C. C. A. 4th 1945) ; Burke v. Union Pacific
R. R., 129 F. 2d 844 (C. C. A. 10th 1942) (The last two cases followed the
Gully case literally.).
The author is not unaware of the force and implications of Mr. Justice Car-
dozo's opinion in the Gdly case. It is submitted that the Gully. case is distinguish,
able from the Osborne case and inapplicable to suits under the Taft-Hartley Act.
The Gully case interpreted the amount of jurisdiction conferred on the federal
courts by the Act of 1875, 18 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1927), but a
suit under the Taft-Hartley Act will not rely on the Act of 1875, because juris-
diction of such suits is expressly conferred upon the federal courts by the Taft-
Hartley Act itself: "Suits for violation of contracts . . . may be brought in any
district court.. .", 29 U. S. C. A. §185(a) (Supp. 1947).
For a complete discussion of "federal question" jurisdiction, see: Forrester,
Federal Question. Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TULANE L. REV. 263 (1943);
Chadbourne and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 639 (1942); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TULANE
L. REV. 362 (1942).
1947]
92 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
sity of citizenship or amount in controversy in any United States district
court having jurisdiction of the parties. A district court is deemed to
have jurisdiction of a union either in the district where the union main-
tains its principal office or in any district in which the authorized agents
of the union are acting for employee members. Service of any legal
process upon an authorized agent is deemed to constitute service on the
labor organization. A money judgment is enforceable against the union
treasury but not the members.
Actually the foregoing are not drastic changes from the prior pro-
cedure. Previously federal courts entertained class suits by and against
unions where the requisite diversity of citizenship was present. Theo-
retically complete diversity of citizenship of all the members had to
exist.11 However, in practice the requisite diversity might readily be
obtained by proper selection of representatives, for only the citizenship
of the representatives need appear.1 2 Furthermore, since suits under the
Act will involve a federal question, it was superfluous to waive the neces-
sity of diversity of citizenship. As to not requiring any specified juris-
dictional amount, it should suffice to point out that Congress has not
established a jurisdictional amourt for many types of suits.18
Since the Coronado case14 and later by virtue of Federal Rule 17(b),
suits to enforce a federal right have been brought in the common name
of the unincorporated association. In passing, it is interesting to notice
that Mr. Padway, the late general counsel of A. F. of L., testified at a
hearing of the Judiciary Committee18 which adopted the above Federal
Rule, to the effect that unions no longer feared being sued in their com-
mon name, "because we, too, have to sue . . . to obtain our rights."
When a judgment is recovered in a suit against an unincorporated asso-
ciation in its common name, the common property is subject to execu-
tion.'6 The Taft-Hartley Act insures against a recurrence similar to
the Danbury Hatters Casey1 where individual members of the union
had their houses sold at execution to pay 'the judgment, by exempting
the property of the individual members from the judgment. Such a
limited liability of union members is similar to that enjoyed by stock-
holders of a corporation-a natural corollary of allowing the unions to
be sued as an entity.
Service of process under the Act seems slightly more liberal than
2 Mooazs FEDERAL PRAcTicE 2100 (1938).
" International Allied Printing Trades Ass'n. v. Master Printers Union of
N. J., 34 F. Supp. 178 (D. N. J. 1940).
1325 STAT. 433 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41 (1927).
1 4United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344
(1922).
Hearings before the Judiciary Committee on H. R. 8892, serial 17, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
1 1 MoopE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE 314 (1938).
"1 Loewe v. Lawlor, 235 U. S. 522 (1914).
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under the Federal Rules. The latter apparently requires valid service
to be on a "process agent" by appointment or by law,' 8 whereas under
the Act any agent is sufficient. The provision with regard to the districts
in which suits may be brought is fortunately uneqaivocal, 19 for, in the
absence of a special venue statute, 28 U. S. C. A. §112 requires suits
involving a federal question to be brought in the district where the
defendant is an "inhabitant." The confusion which has resulted as to
where a defending unincorporated association is an "inhabitant" 20 is
avoided by the Act's explicit provisions concerning venue..
In 1902, Mr. Justice Brandeis, considered a friend of labor, declared:
"The unions should squarely take the position that they are amenable
to the law."21 Mr. Padway testified in 1938 that labor no longer feared
being sued as an entity.22 In 1947, why do unions object to being sued
for breach of contract when only the contracting employers or other
unions may sue and only the common property of the union is subject
to execution?
A partial reason may be that unions still have an inherent fear of
lawyers and courts. This fear is not unfounded. In courts, the rights
of unions may be determined on technicalities and not on the merits of
the labor dispute. This is especially likely because presiding judges are
fully equipped to be judges in courts of law but not necessarily states-
men in the field of labor relations.
Liability for damages resulting from. wildcat 'strikes in breach of
"no-strike" clauses has been attacked by the unions on the grounds that
it imposes liability for acts beyond union control. It is a well .known
fact that unions have not always been successful in controlling the rank
and file of their members. Moreover, it may be more difficult to obtain
discipline in light of the provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act insuring
the rights of individual employees 23 and discouraging union security
agreements2 4 Although the Act expressly states that a union is "bound
by the acts of its agent" 25 and that "the question of whether the specific
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified 'shall
not be controlling," 26 the Act does not transform unions ifito insurers.
28 FFD. R. Civ. P., 4(d) (3).
1 961 STAT. -, 29 U. S. C. A. §185 (c) (Supp. 1947) (Suits may be brought
in any district court having jurisdiction of the parties. Courts shall be deemed
to have jurisdiction -of unions either in the district in which it maintains its prin-
cipal office or in any district where its agents are engaged in representing employee
members.).
2' United States v. Sutherland, 74 F. 2d 89 (C. C. A. 8th 1934).
"1Address before the Economics Club of Boston, December 4, 1902.
2 See note 16, supra.
2361 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. A. §§141(b), 157, 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3),
158(b) (1), 158(b) (2), 158(b) (5), 159(a), 159(c) (1) (A).
"" Id. §§158(a)(3), 158(b)(2), 158(b) (5), 159(e through h), 186(c)(4).
2 Id. §185 (b).
"Id. §§152(13), 185(e). *These sections render inapplicable the test of union
19471
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Instead, unions, like employers, are subject to the common law rules of
agency-2'scope of employment, etc." A union member is not an
"agent" solely by virtue of his membership.2 7
In former agreements the "no-strike" provisions have been so loosely
drafted, e.g., "The Union... agrees... there shall be no strikes, walk-
outs, slow-downs or other interference with normal operation . . . "
that unions have apparently assumed the role of insurers. In the future
such a consequence may bd avoided by precisely defining in just which
cases the union assumes responsibility.
Some unions have advocated -refusing "no-strike" clauses, but others,
like the Boilermakers-A. F. of L., say the presence or absence of no-
strike clauses is immaterial, for arbitration machinery implies an obli-
gation not to strike. On the question of the legality of refusing to
insert a "no-strike" clause, the Senate Committee reported such a clause
was a point to be bargained for.
28
Unions are currently attempting to obtain a waiver of damage liabil-
ity for breach of contract from employers. The availability of such
waivers as valid defenses to damage suits is open t6 question. In other
fields of litigation, although some courts have upheld waivers not to
sue,2 federal courts have held such waivers to be contrary to public
polity and void.30
The clauses for waiver of damage liability which unions are cur-
rently attempting to secure may possibly be distinguished from the usual
exculpation clause which confronts courts. In the first place, these
waivers'by employers are of unions' contractual liability, in contrast with
the usual exculpation clauses which waive liability for negligence. The
greatest distinction is that the parties are roughly equal in bargaining
power.3 ' According to press reports, in the Murray, the Ford and the
International Harvester agreements with the UAW-CIO, the employ-
ers agreed to a partial waiver of damage liability in consideration of
prompt specified action by the union to get wildcat strikers back on the
job plus the right to fire the strikers through an impartial umpire. Thus
the employer has traded his action for damages for uninterrupted
production.
"agents" set forth in Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 775 (March 10, 1947).
2793 CoNG. REc. 4561 (May 2, 1947).
SEx. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947).
29 Smith v. MacDonald, 37 Cal. App. 503, 174 Pac. 80 (1918); Kennon v. Shep-
pard, 236 Mass. 57., 127 N. E. 426 (1926).
" Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (C. C. A. 6th 1944) ; American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Anaconda, 138 F. 2d 765 (C. C. A. 5th 1943). See Tobin Quarries
v. Central Neb. Public Power and Irrigation Dist., 64 F. Supp. 200, 208 (D. C.
Neb. 1946).
"N ote, The Signjicance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the Law of
Exculpation, 37 Cot. L. RE. 249 (1937).
[Vol. 26
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Furthermore, the Conference Committee deleted a provision which
made the breach of collective bargaining agreements an unfair labor
practice.3 2 From this action it might be inferred that Congress intended
redress for breach of contract to be a personal privilege rather than an
unwaivable enforcement device. Contrast the silence of the Taft-
Hartley Act on this point with the Federal Employers' Liability Act
wherein Congress expressly declared "any contract ... to exempt [an
employer] from any liability created by this chapter ... shall be void."38
Limitation of the amount of damages may be another mode by which
labor may protect itself against the ravages of damage liability. Noth-
ing in the Act seems to prohibit bargaining for such a clause.
In contrast with contractual liability which may be minimized or
totally avoided through bargaining, damage liability for "unlawful"
strikes and boycotts (also unfair labor practices) 3 4 may be an unwaiv-
able enforcement device. "Whoever shall be injured in his business or
property" by an "unlawful" strike or boycott may sue the union in
either the federal courts or the state courts. The language is com-
parable with the Sherman Act's provision for actions for treble damages.
Although the actual damages are not augmented in the Taft-Hartley
Act, damage liability, along with administrative cease and desist orders
and court injunctions, will provide an important sanction for policing
those outlawed labor practices.
This liability may prove detrimental to labor-management relations,
if time and experience prove Congress went too far in outlawing all
secondary strikes and boycotts without attempting to distinguish those
which are unjustified from those justified by the union's "interest in a
reasonable area of economic conflict." 35
Like so many features of the Taft-Hartley Act, liability for "un-
lawful" strikes and boycotts is open to abuse. It may lead to a plethora
of suits against unions. An ever present and potential culprit is the
anti-union employer. He will hesitate before bringing a breach of con-
tract suit against the union with which he bargains,36 but he may have no
qualms about bringing vexatious suits against a union with which he has
no collective bargaining relations.
HENRY E. COLTON.
" H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
" 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §55 (1943).
3'61 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. A. §158(b) (4) (Supp. 1947).
" It is submitted that the following cases involve boycotts of the latter type:
Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th 1908);
State v. Vail Pelt, 136 N. C. 633, 49 S. E. 177 (1904).
"' The fact that no suits have been prosecuted under N. C. GENr. STAT. (1943)
§1-97(6), which apparently authorizes suits against unions, during the four years
since its enactment is indicative that employers do not lust to sue unions.
